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LET LEGISLATORS LEGISLATE: THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER 
ALLOWING MEMBERS OF CONGRESS TO FILE 
INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS TO AVOID LITIGATION 
Matthew Higgins* 
“If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels 
were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government 
would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered 
by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the 
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to 
control itself.”  
 
- James Madison, President of the United States1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When an individual is elected to office, voters expect him or her to 
behave ethically. Furthermore, voters expect their representative to be 
held accountable if they behave unethically or break the law. American 
voters have historically held their representatives to a high standard and 
held firm in the notion that no one is above the law in our system of 
democracy.2 The United States government is also based on the notion 
that avoiding tyranny is best accomplished through a decentralized 
government.3 
One way to ensure a decentralized government and avoid the 
centralization of power is to ensure that each branch of government is 
armed with self-defense against the other branches.4 The founders granted 
each branch of government exclusive powers through the various articles 
of the Constitution.5 A nightmare scenario of the framers was that one 
branch could intimidate the other through the use of the judiciary.6 For 
instance, if the Executive could intimidate legislators into following its 
agenda by indicting individual legislators and burdening them with 
 
* Associate Member, 2018-19, University of Cincinnati Law Review 
 1. James Madison, The Federalist Papers no. 51 (1788). 
 2. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 715 (1974). 
 3. “[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same 
department consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means 
and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in 
all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack.” Scalia’s dissent in Morrison v. Olson, 
487 U.S. 654, 698 (1988) (quoting Federalist No. 51, pp. 321–322). 
 4. Id. 
 5. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I; id. art. II; id. art. III.  
 6. Works of Thomas Jefferson, 322–23 (1797). 
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litigation, the founders believed that this would cause a disturbance in the 
balance of the government. 
To avoid this nightmare, the Speech or Debate clause was included in 
the Constitution.7 The separation of powers doctrine was also implicit in 
the structure of the Constitution and explicitly included in provisions such 
as the Rulemaking Clause.8 When legislators have been indicted, Courts 
have traditionally allowed these provisions to permit a Member of 
Congress to file an interlocutory appeal.9 
An interlocutory appeal is an appeal of a ruling by a trial court that is 
made before the trial itself has commenced or concluded.  Interlocutory 
appeals are generally disfavored because they can lead to piecemeal 
litigation and judicial inefficiency.10 As an exception, due to weighty 
policy concerns, infra, federal appellate courts have allowed Members of 
Congress to file pre-trial interlocutory appeals based on either a Speech 
or Debate Clause argument or a separation of powers doctrine argument.11 
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit recently disallowed a Member of 
Congress to rely on a separation of powers argument and denied 
jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal, creating a circuit split.12 This is 
problematic because it limits a Member of Congress’s ability to avoid the 
burdens of litigation. If a Member of Congress is improperly burdened 
with litigation, he or she is unable to adequately represent his or her 
constituents.  
This Article will discuss the practical effects of each side of the Circuit 
split’s approaches and conclude that Second, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. 
Circuits’ approach should be adopted by all Circuit Courts. This Article 
proceeds as follows: first, Section II of this note will provide a general 
background of the Speech and Debate Clause and the separation of 
powers doctrine. Then, Section III will discuss the circuit split in detail 
which currently consists of the Second, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. 
Circuits agreeing that Members of Congress can seek interlocutory appeal 
based on both a Speech and Debate Clause argument and a separation of 
powers argument, whereas the Seventh Circuit only allows an 
interlocutory appeal based on the explicit “immunity” created by the 
 
 7. U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 6, cl. 1. 
 8. Only the House can interpret its rules and punish its Members under them. U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 5, cl. 2. 
 9. An indictment in this context will likely arise out of alleged unethical or criminal behavior 
surrounding the duties of Congressmen—charges such as bribery or tax evasion. See generally United 
States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 932, 935–36 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 10. See 28 U.S. Code § 1292.  
 11. See United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 932, 935–36 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Helstoski v. Meanor, 
442 U.S. 500 (1979)). 
 12. United States v. Schock, 891 F.3d 334 (7th Cir. 2018). 
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Speech or Debate clause.13 After discussing the circuit split, Section IV 
will provide a more detailed argument of the Seventh Circuit’s approach 
and concludes that the Seventh Circuit’s approach is incorrect because it 
does not consider key policy concerns mentioned by other Circuits, 
improperly creates a structural versus individual separation of powers 
doctrine, tarnishes a representative democracy, and lacks judicial 
restraint.  
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
A. The Speech or Debate Clause14 
The inclusion of the Speech or Debate Clause in the American 
Constitution was influenced by the English legal tradition, or Common 
Law.15 The Clause states: “[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House, 
[Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other 
Place.”16 The Speech or Debate Clause is a privilege which, in theory, 
allows elected representatives to best focus on their representative duties 
by freeing them from coercion by the Judiciary or Executive branches of 
government.17 Its key purpose is to “prevent intimidation by the executive 
and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary.”18 
Although the Speech or Debate Clause was born from English 
tradition, the child is not identical to its parent. In the English system of 
government, Parliament is the supreme authority, rather than a co-equal 
branch of government.19 While the English speech or debate privilege 
preserves legislative supremacy, the American privilege merely ensures 
the legislative branch remains independent from its coordinate branches.20  
Therefore, the Supreme Court of the United States has restricted the 
Speech or Debate Clause privilege to only “legislative acts.”21 
Specifically, the privilege applies only to actions related to voting and 
 
 13. See United States v. Rose, 28 F.3d 181, 185–86 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v. Claiborne, 
727 F.2d 842, 844–45 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706, 708–09 (11th Cir. 1982); 
Myers, 635 F.2d at 935–36 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 14. This section was largely guided by Rose, 28 F.3d at 181. 
 15. See Rose, 28 F.3d at 187. The English speech or debate privilege is enshrined in the English 
Bill of Rights. It arose out of a “history of conflict between the House of Commons and the Tudor and 
Stuart Monarchs during which successive monarchs utilized the criminal and civil law to suppress and 
intimidate critical legislators.” United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178 (1966). 
 16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
 17. Works of Thomas Jefferson, 322–23 (1797). 
 18. Johnson, 383 U.S. at 181. 
 19. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 508 (1972). 
 20. Id.  
 21. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972). 
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various committee activities.22 Surprisingly, the Court has held that many 
activities that are commonly on a representative’s schedule, such as 
communicating with government agencies, assisting in securing 
government contracts, or delivering speeches outside of Congress are not 
protected under the Speech or Debate privilege.23 
As discussed below, Members of Congress facing charges in a federal 
district court commonly rely on the Speech or Debate Clause to argue 
immunity from litigation.24 The common argument presented is that the 
Judiciary does not have the authority to question the actions done in the 
legislative branch. Of course, to win on this argument the Member of 
Congress must persuade the court that his or her actions in question were 
“legislative acts” and thus qualify for the privilege.  
B. Separation of Powers Doctrine  
After defeating King George III, The Framers of the Constitution 
believed decentralization of government through separation of powers to 
be of the utmost importance to the success of the newly formed 
Republic.25 The Separation of Powers doctrine is also referred to as a 
system of “Checks and Balances.” Different articles of the Constitution 
grant different powers to each branch of government.26 Article I of the 
Constitution grants specific powers to Congress which the other branches 
are not granted.27 Specifically, it grants each House of Congress the power 
to regulate its own members: “Each House may determine the Rules of 
its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with 
the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.”28 
Members of Congress commonly argue that another branch of 
government cannot bring a claim against, or oversee a case against, a 
member of the legislative branch because such claims encroach on the 
separation of powers doctrine. Because the Constitution granted Congress 
 
 22. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 313 (1973) (Committee activities such as: “authorizing an 
investigation, holding hearings, preparing a report, and authorizing the publication and distribution of that 
report”). 
 23. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 512.  
 24. See supra note 9. 
 25. James Madison, The Federalist Papers no. 47 (1788). (“The accumulation of all powers, 
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether 
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny").  Also, 
post-Revolutionary War Americans increasingly viewed the separation of powers as "the most important 
attribute of the kinds of governments they had fought for." Entin, Jonathan L., "Separation of Powers, the 
Political Branches, and the Limits of Judicial Review" (1990). Faculty Publications. Paper 367 (quoting 
G. Wood, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 453 (1969). 
 26. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I; id. art. II; id. art. III.. 
 27. U.S. CONST. art. I.   
 28. U.S. CONST.  art. I, § 5, cl. 2.  
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the power to self-regulate its Members, Members of Congress argue that 
another branch cannot litigate the internal affairs of Congress. 29  
III. AN OVERVIEW 
There is a long history of jurisprudence allowing for Members of 
Congress to file for interlocutory appeal based on arguments claiming 
immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause or the separation of powers 
doctrine.30 The general consensus among the federal circuits was that the 
policy reasons for normally disallowing interlocutory appeals—mainly 
judicial efficiency—were outweighed by the policy considerations of 
Members of Congress facing litigation.31 The policy concern for 
legislators is that they cannot properly represent their constituents if they 
are burdened with litigation. Therefore, the interlocutory appeal situation 
most commonly arose when a pretrial motion to dismiss a claim based on 
either the Speech or Debate Clause or a separations of powers argument 
had been denied by the district court. The denial of the aforementioned 
claim is not a “final order,” but many Circuit Courts grant interlocutory 
appeal because allowing litigation in the district court to begin would 
defeat valid policy concerns raised by the Members of Congress and 
accepted by most federal circuit courts.32 
Presently, all Circuits are in agreement that the Speech or Debate 
Clause is a valid argument under which to seek interlocutory appeal.33 
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit recently held that while the Speech or 
Debate Clause argument was valid, the separation of powers doctrine was 
not a valid argument to seek interlocutory appeal.34 This decision created 
a Circuit Split between the Seventh Circuit, and the Second, Ninth, 
Eleventh and D.C. Circuits which allow a Member of Congress to raise a 
separation of powers argument in order to seek interlocutory appeal.  
A. Courts in Favor of Allowing Congressional Interlocutory Appeals 
Based on the Separation of Powers Doctrine 
The Second, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits are in agreement that 
individuals can seek interlocutory appeal based on a separation of powers 
argument.35 However, only the Second and D.C. Circuit have dealt with 
 
 29.  See cases cited supra note 13. 
 30. See cases cited supra note 13. 
 31. See cases cited supra note 13. 
 32. United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 932, 935–36 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 33. This is because there is Supreme Court precedent on the matter in Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 
U.S. 500, 506–08 (1979). 
 34. United States. v. Schock, 891 F.3d 334 (7th Cir. 2018). 
 35. See cases cited supra note 13. 
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the issue in respect to a Member of Congress raising the separation of 
powers argument.36  
In United States v. Myers, Congressman Michael O. Myers of 
Pennsylvania sought an interlocutory appeal from the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals after a federal district court denied his motion to dismiss 
an Ethics in Government Act action brought against him by the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”).37 Because the action against him was 
brought by the DOJ, an entity of the Executive Branch, he claimed 
immunity based on the separation of powers doctrine and the Speech or 
Debate Clause.38 The Court of Appeals relied on Supreme Court 
precedent in Helstoski to determine that the Member of Congress was 
entitled to a pretrial appeal under the Speech or Debate Clause.39  
For the same reasoning that the Second Circuit Court allowed the 
Speech or Debate Clause to be the basis for the interlocutory appeal, it 
allowed review of the dismissal on the grounds of separation of powers.40 
The Court noted that the separation of powers argument does not provide 
as precise of a protection as the Speech or Debate Clause, but the 
underlying policies of the separation of powers doctrine require that a 
Member of Congress be shielded from standing trial before another 
branch of government.41 The Court reasoned that the two arguments were 
in the same spirit of protecting the independence of the Legislative Branch 
and ensuring that constituents were fully represented by their 
Representatives and Senators.42  
The Myers Court went on to weigh the policy concerns of allowing a 
Member of Congress to avoid litigation versus the interest of judicial 
efficiency that traditionally precludes piecemeal litigation.43 The Court 
found that the following concerns of the Members of Congress outweigh 
the concern of judicial efficiency: (1) The strain, expense, and injury to 
reputation resulting from a trial, even if the Member of Congress prevails 
at trial, will have adverse consequences to a representative democracy; 
and (2) the opportunity for intimidation by the Executive Branch is 
reduced by the knowledge that prosecutions encountering valid legal 
defenses will be promptly terminated by an interlocutory appeal before 
the trial even commences.44 The Court opined that “little would be lost in 
 
 36. Claiborne and Hastings dealt with federal judges, not Members of Congress.  
 37. Myers, 635 F.2d at 934. 
 38. Id. at 935. 
 39. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 32. 
 40. Myers, 635 F.2d at 934 (“[T]he Speech or Debate Clause, when applicable, provides the kind 
of protection that should be vindicated by preventing a trial, rather than setting aside its outcome”). 
 41. Id.  
 42. Myers, 635 F.2d at 936.  
 43. Id.  
 44. Id.  
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the way of judicial efficiency if pre-trial appeals by indicted Members of 
Congress were to include all legal defenses.”45 
Twenty-four years after the Myers decision, the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals found the reasoning in Myers to be “particularly instructive” to 
its decision in United States v. Rose.46 Like in Myers, the DOJ brought an 
action against a Congressman, Charles G. Rose III. After the district court 
judge denied the Congressman’s motion to dismiss, Rose filed for 
interlocutory appeal based on the separation of powers doctrine and the 
Speech or Debate Clause.47 Rose’s case was very similar to Myers, but it 
did have one key difference: Myers was a criminal case, while Rose was 
a civil case.48 The Rose Court concluded that the difference was 
immaterial because the immunity protects legislators from any type of 
litigation.49  
The Rose Court held that it had appellate jurisdiction over both the 
separation of powers claim, and the Speech or Debate Clause claim.50 
Relying on Myers, the Court reasoned that “like the Speech or Debate 
Clause immunity, separation of powers immunity should protect 
legislators from the burden of litigation and diversion from congressional 
duties, whether the litigation be civil or criminal.”51 
Although both Courts of Appeals determined that they had appellate 
jurisdiction over both the separation of powers and Speech or Debate 
Clause claim, each affirmed the decision of the district court. Therefore, 
both Congressmen still faced “the burdens of litigation” after the grant of 
interlocutory appeal.52  
B. The Seventh Circuit’s Decision in United States v. Schock  
Aaron Schock was a United States Representative for the Eighteenth 
District of Illinois.53 In March 2015, he resigned from Congress after his 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. United States v. Rose, 28 F.3d 181, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1994).  
 47. Id. at 182-183.  
 48. Id. at 186. 
 49. Id. (emphasis added). 
 50. Id. at 185. 
 51. Id. at 186.  
 52. Id. at 190; Myers, 635 F.2d at 942. This is an important fact that will be covered more in Part 
IV. In sum, the separation of powers doctrine gives Congressman a tool to use to potentially avoid 
litigation and enjoy its immunity. The reality, however, is that, in most cases, the court grants the 
interlocutory appeal but still affirms the district court’s dismissal of the claim for immunity from litigation. 
See infra Part IV. 
 53. Elvia Malagon, Ex-Rep. Aaron Schock's Trial on Federal Corruption Charges Moved to June, 
Chicago Tribune, October 5, 2018, https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-met-aaron-
schock-court-hearing-20181003-story.html. (last visited on November 15, 2018). 
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constituents took issue with trips he took at the public’s expense.54  
Twenty months after his resignation, he was charged in a federal 
indictment for mail and wire fraud, theft of government funds, making 
false statements to Congress and the Federal Elections Commission, and 
filing false tax returns.55 After being indicted, Shock moved to dismiss 
the indictment on claims that the charge was inconsistent with the Speech 
or Debate Clause and the separation of powers doctrine.56 The district 
court denied his motion to dismiss and he appealed to the Seventh 
Circuit.57  
First, the Seventh Circuit held that interlocutory appeals are permitted 
under the Speech or Debate Clause, but the immunity granted under the 
Speech or Debate Clause did not apply to Schock because his actions were 
not “legislative acts.”58 Then, the Court moved to the principle argument: 
the rules about reimbursable expenses were adopted under Art. 1, §5, cl. 
2 of the Constitution, and only the House can interpret its rules and punish 
its Members under them.59 The Seventh Circuit explained its reasoning 
for not being persuaded by the decisions of other circuits as follows: 
Neither the separation of powers generally, nor the Rulemaking Clause in 
particular, establishes a personal immunity from prosecution or trial. The 
separation of powers is about the allocation of authority among the 
branches of the federal government. It is an institutional doctrine rather 
than a personal one. The Speech or Debate Clause, by contrast, sets up a 
personal immunity for each legislator. The Supreme Court limits 
interlocutory appeals to litigants who have a personal immunity—a “right 
not to be tried.” No personal immunity, no interlocutory appeal.60 
The Court based its holding on the difference between “institutional” 
and “personal” rights.61 Essentially, the Court held that the Speech or 
Debate Clause created a specific personal immunity from litigation, but 
the separation of powers doctrine did not. Instead, the separation of 
powers doctrine merely applied to the branches of government as 
institutions, not the individuals within them. Finally, the Court affirmed 
 
 54. United States v. Schock, 891 F.3d 334, 335-336 (7th Cir. 2018). Some of the alleged expenses 
were using money from his campaign accounts and his House allowance for personal expenses ranging 
from an extravagant remodeling of his home office inspired by the British television show “Downton 
Abbey” to flying on a private plane to a Chicago Bears game. Elvia Malagon, Ex-Rep. Aaron Schock's 
Trial on Federal Corruption Charges Moved to June, Chicago Tribune, October 5, 2018 (last visited on 
November 15, 2018). 
 55. Schock, 891 F.3d at 336. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id.  
 58. Id.   
 59. Id. at 336. 
 60. Id. at 337. 
 61. Id. at 338.  
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the district court’s decision with respect to the Speech or Debate Clause 
and dismissed the appeal based on a separation of powers argument.62  
It is important to note that the holding of the Schock case applies to 
interlocutory appeals in criminal cases based on institutional arguments 
about the separation of powers.63 However, the reasoning in Rose is still 
compelling because differences between criminal or civil causes of action 
are immaterial to the underlying policy concerns of protecting legislators 
from the burdens of litigation, criminal or civil.64 
IV. DISCUSSION 
This section will discuss why the Second, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. 
Circuits are correct in allowing Members of Congress to file interlocutory 
appeals based on a separation of powers argument. The balancing test 
given in Myers is the correct framework for analyzing the issue regarding 
whether the policy concerns permitting Members of Congress to avoid 
the burdens of litigation outweigh the need for judicial efficiency.65 The 
answer to this issue is clearly “yes,” because the judicial system should 
not place efficiency above more weighty concerns like the Members’ 
duties to their constituents.66  
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit’s institutional separation of powers 
logic is inherently flawed. A clear understanding of the history behind the 
Speech or Debate Clause and separation of powers doctrine shows the 
similarity in the underlying concerns which birthed their creation and 
inclusion in the Constitution. The Rulemaking clause, analyzed as part of 
the separations of powers doctrine, is proof enough that the separation of 
powers doctrine does not only apply to each branch of government as an 
institution, but to the individuals within the institution as well. To say 
otherwise is non-functional and contrary to any sensible understanding of 
history. 
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit mistakenly reasoned that allowing a 
Member of Congress to file for interlocutory appeal under a separation of 
powers doctrine would create Congressional immunity from litigation.67 
An interlocutory appeal for a motion to dismiss does not create immunity, 
it creates the opportunity for immunity. This is a key distinction because 
a proper understanding of it negates the argument that allowing the 
interlocutory appeal would permit Members of Congress to be above the 
 
 62. Id. at 340. 
 63. Id. at 339. 
 64. Rose, 28 F.3d at 186. 
 65. United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 932, 936 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 66. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983). 
 67. Schock, 891 F.3d at 337. 
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law. In the two principle cases already described, Myers and Rose, the 
district courts’ decisions were affirmed, and the Members of Congress 
still faced litigation after the interlocutory appeal was heard.68 Allowing 
an exception to the general rule against interlocutory appeals in this 
context merely gives the opportunity for immunity if the Member of 
Congress can persuade the court of his or her argument.  
A possible explanation for the Seventh Circuit’s split with the other 
circuits are the facts underlying the charges against Congressman Schock. 
His alleged misuse of funds was highly publicized because he was 
deemed a “rising star” in the Republican party and the expenses were 
outrageous, ranging from personal tickets to the Chicago Bears to 
remodeling his home office in a style inspired by “Downtown Abbey.”69  
Because of these outrageous facts, the Seventh Circuit may not have 
wanted to allow any additional avenue for the Congressman to escape 
litigation. By closing the door to the Speech or Debate Clause claim, the 
court sent the message that no individual is above the law, even Members 
of Congress. While that motivation may be compelling, especially in 
Shock’s case, it is unnecessary. Allowing an interlocutory appeal based 
on the Speech or Debate Clause does not automatically create immunity. 
It is simply a carve-out to the general rule against interlocutory appeals. 
A court still has discretion to dismiss the interlocutory appeal and affirm 
the district court’s decision, sending a Congressman’s case to litigation. 
If a possible immunity does not apply, then it does not apply. That does 
not, however, negate the fact that the immunity still exists for other cases 
and circumstances. Although the Seventh Circuit may have had 
compelling reasons for its decision, it was an unnecessary and incorrect 
decision to make.  
Using Myers as a framework, courts should liberally construe the 
separation of powers doctrine and the Speech or Debate Clause to allow 
Members of Congress facing litigation more, not less, tools to avoid the 
burdens of litigation.   
A. The Policy Concerns Allowing Members of Congress to File an 
Interlocutory Appeal Outweigh the Concern for Judicial Efficiency—
Why the Second, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits are Right.  
The primary reason for not allowing interlocutory appeals as a general 
rule is to avoid piecemeal litigation in the interest of judicial efficiency.70 
However, the Supreme Court has stated that “[c]onvenience and 
efficiency are not the primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of 
 
 68. Myers, 635 F.2d at 942; United States v. Rose, 28 F.3d 181, 190 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 69. Malagon, supra note 52. 
 70. Myers, 635 F.2d at 956. 
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democratic government.”71 Moreover, the rule against interlocutory 
appeals has other exceptions. For instance, interlocutory decisions, while 
not final, are appealable if they have a final and irreparable effect on the 
rights of the parties.72  While there are exceptions to the general rule 
against interlocutory appeals, each is narrowly applied.73 
The Myers and Rose courts correctly applied a narrow exception to the 
general rule that stemmed from the Speech or Debate Clause and the 
separation of powers doctrine. While it is understandable that allowing 
piecemeal litigation would burden the courts, the reason to allow it in this 
context outweighs the burden. If a court did not allow a Member of 
Congress to seek interlocutory appeal, irreparable harm would be done to 
the Member of Congress’s political capital and reputation which in turn 
hurts his or her ability to represent constituents.74  
Imagine the following scenario: A Congresswoman is in her second 
term of office. She has spent years fighting diligently against a pipeline 
which she believes would ruin the natural beauty of the state she 
represents. In fact, she ran her campaign heavily on this specific issue and 
was elected in a landslide. After years of work and political maneuvering, 
she is finally able to bring a bill to the floor to oppose the construction of 
the pipeline. Months before the bill is on the floor, the hypothetical 
Congresswoman is indicted for allegedly misusing federal funds. She files 
a motion to dismiss based on the Speech or Debate Clause or the 
separation of powers doctrine. The district court denies her motion. She 
likely has a stronger argument based on the separation of powers doctrine; 
however, if the case was in the Seventh Circuit she would be unable to 
file for interlocutory appeal based on this argument. As a consequence, 
she is burdened with litigation. Now, instead of whipping votes for her 
bill, she is preparing for trial.  
The consequence of the above hypothetical is clear: an elected official 
can no longer represent her constituents because of the burdens of 
litigation. The most frightening result is if she ends up with a favorable 
outcome at trial because, now, it was a waste of time and a distraction that 
affected her ability to represent her constituents.  
On the other hand, had the Seventh Circuit aligned with the other 
circuit courts and permitted the appeal to be based on a separation of 
powers argument, there is a strong chance that she may prevail on appeal 
and get back to Congress without much wasted time. An appellate court 
should accept this argument because it addresses the same policy 
concerns of the Speech or Debate Clause and gives a Congresswoman 
 
 71. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944.  
 72. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545 (1949) (collateral order doctrine).  
 73. Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009). 
 74. Myers, 635 F.2d at 936.  
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additional tools to avoid unnecessary and distracting litigation. If a court 
is not persuaded by the argument, it can affirm the district court’s 
decision. If a court is persuaded, however, the Congresswoman is now 
able to continue her work in the House. She will likely still face an internal 
investigation and hearing, but it will be much less burdensome than a trial. 
Therefore, if she is guilty or liable, she is still held accountable for her 
actions through a House ethics investigation. 
There are other policy concerns outside of the above hypothetical 
which are also compelling for permitting the separation of powers 
doctrine to be the basis of an interlocutory appeal in this situation: 
deterring the executive from using the courts to intimidate Members of 
Congress if it is known that they can terminate the action before trial, 
harming constituents, and diminishing the public’s trust in a 
representative form of government.75 
For all of the above reasons, the policy concerns of allowing an 
interlocutory appeal under a separation of powers argument greatly 
outweigh judicial efficiency. The Seventh Circuit should not have shut 
the door on the opportunity to uphold these policy concerns. By 
disallowing an interlocutory appeal based on the separation of powers 
doctrine, the Seventh Circuit is greatly harming the representative 
democratic system of our government. The judiciary should show 
restraint and tread lightly when potentially exercising power over another 
branch of government.76 
B. The Separation of Powers Doctrine is More Than a Schoolhouse 
Rock! Song 
The institutional versus personal separation of powers argument the 
Seventh Circuit utilized is not based in law or reality. As a reminder, the 
Seventh Circuit used the following reasoning for its holding in Schock:  
The separation of powers is about the allocation of authority among the 
branches of the federal government. It is an institutional doctrine rather 
than a personal one. The Speech or Debate Clause, by contrast, sets up a 
personal immunity for each legislator.77  
 
The court almost entirely relies on this distinction to reach its conclusion 
that an interlocutory appeal is not proper under the separation of powers 
doctrine.   
 
 75. Id.   
 76. Daniel N. Reisman, “Deconstructing Justice Scalia’s Separation of Powers Jurisprudence: The 
Preeminent Executive, 53 Alb. L. Rev. 49 (1988-1989).  
 77. United States v. Schock, 891 F.3d 334, 337 (7th Cir. 2018). 
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This distinction seems to be created by the Seventh Circuit judges. In 
an attempt to prove its reasoning, the Shock court lists the other 
interlocutory appeal cases, discussed above, and points out how none of 
them address the institutional separation of powers logic.78 The reason for 
the omission is that the distinction is a matter of legal fiction created by 
the Seventh Circuit.  
The Framers established a system designed to prevent overreaching by 
one branch at the expense of another.79 To ensure a functional 
government, the Constitution provides officials of each branch with the 
“necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist 
encroachments of the others.”80 Therefore, the separation of powers 
doctrine is not merely an institutional blueprint, but a living and breathing 
doctrine that serves to protect against tyranny. To be effective, members 
of each branch must adhere to only the powers allotted to their respective 
branch of government.81 Of course, the Constitution does not contemplate 
total separation of the branches of government;82 therefore, the separation 
of powers doctrine protects against tyranny while simultaneously 
permitting sufficient interaction between the branches.83 
The Seventh Circuit failed to realize that the separation of powers 
doctrine is a functionalist doctrine. To state that it is merely about the 
allocation of authority among the branches of the federal government is 
grossly inaccurate. Although the separation of powers doctrine does in 
fact allocate authority among the branches, that is not the end of its 
function and intention. The doctrine is not merely a Schoolhouse Rock! 
description of the federal government; it is a doctrine that is present 
whenever the branches of government are interacting with each other.84  
Moreover, branches of government are not only the institutions 
described in the Constitution, but also the officers within them. Therefore, 
it is entirely proper for a Member of Congress to raise a separation of 
powers argument in the judiciary when seeking interlocutory appeal. For 
the separation of powers doctrine to be effective, it must be invoked 
aggressively by officials to safeguard the powers enumerated to their 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. Entin, Jonathan L., "Separation of Powers, the Political Branches, and the Limits of Judicial 
Review" (1990). Faculty Publications. Paper 367. 
 80. Entin, Jonathan L., "Separation of Powers, the Political Branches, and the Limits of Judicial 
Review" (1990). Faculty Publications. Paper 367 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51). 
 81. Entin, Jonathan L., "Separation of Powers, the Political Branches, and the Limits of Judicial 
Review" (1990). Faculty Publications. Paper 367. 
 82. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976). 
 83. Id.  
 84. Schoolhouse Rock! was a popular educational television series which taught various topics to 
children, including American history and government, through song. One of the most popular songs 
described how a bill becomes law: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H-eYBZFEzf8. 
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respective branches. The Seventh Circuit’s decision to disallow such an 
argument is in direct conflict with the intention of the Framers.85 While 
“immunity” may not be the correct term to use, the separation of powers 
doctrine does create a level of sovereignty from other branches. To say 
that applies only to the institution of Congress fails to realize that the 
institution is run by the officials within it. In certain circumstances, the 
actions of Members of Congress are immune from the powers of the 
judiciary based on the separation of powers doctrine.  
Assuming, arguendo, that the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning is correct, 
the policy concerns described in Myers should still direct a court to allow 
a separation of powers argument in this context. The court should be 
liberal, not restrictive, in allowing Members of Congress the opportunity 
to avoid litigation when appropriate. A court with judicial restraint 
understands the consequences of asserting its power over a Member of 
Congress or the Executive.  
C. A Framework for a Coherent Precedent: The Myers Balancing Test 
As discussed above, the Myers opinion should be used as precedent to 
resolve the Circuit Split. Moving forward, appellate courts should utilize 
the following framework when a Member of Congress moves for an 
interlocutory appeal based on either the Speech or Debate Clause or the 
separation of powers doctrine.  
First, the Myers court determined that the Speech or Debate Clause was 
properly before the court under Helstoski.86 Then, the court applied 
similar reasoning from Helstoski to determine that the Member of 
Congress was entitled to pre-trial review of his challenges to the 
indictment grounded on the doctrine of separation of powers.87 
The court then supported its conclusion by weighing certain policies 
underlying the separation of powers doctrine against the policy of judicial 
efficiency of avoiding piecemeal litigation.88 The main policy concerns 
that shield a Member of Congress from standing trial are: (1) Members of 
Congress serve as a vital check upon the executive and judicial branches 
for the right of the people who elected the Senators and Congressmen; (2) 
it is not too extravagant that a Member of Congress is entitled to pre-trial 
review; (3) the interest in avoiding strain, expense, and injury to 
reputation resulting from a trial on criminal charges even if the outcome 
is favorable is especially compelling for Members of Congress; (4) 
vindication on appeal will come after considerable political damage; (5) 
 
 85. See Jefferson, supra notes 17-18.  
 86. United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 932, 935 (2d Cir, 1980). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 935-936.  
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the Member’s capacity to represent his or her constituents is impaired; 
and (6) it prevents intimidation by the executive and accountability before 
a possibly hostile judiciary.89 These six weighty concerns easily tip the 
balance in favor of allowing an exception to the general rule against 
interlocutory appeals.  
After accepting pre-trial review, the Myers court proceeded to analyze 
the merits of both contentions made by the Member of Congress.90 After 
addressing each point of contention, the court determined that the limits 
of the Constitution and law had not been exceeded. Therefore, it affirmed 
the district court’s order denying dismissal of the indictment.91 
If a court follows the simple framework of: (1) establishing appellate 
jurisdiction; and (2) addressing each point of contention to determine 
whether the limits of the Constitution and the law have been exceeded, it 
can properly balance policy concerns to ensure both a lack of judicial 
encroachment and that no one is above the law. If the limits of the 
Constitution and the law have been exceeded, the Member of Congress 
will avoid litigation and face the consequences of his or her actions in his 
or her own House. If the court determines the limits have not been 
exceeded, as it did in the cases reviewed by this Article, the court simply 
affirms the district court’s decision and the Member must endure the 
burdens of litigation. This method respects the Constitution and ensures 
trust in the independence of the Legislature.  
V. CONCLUSION  
The Seventh Circuit unnecessarily created a circuit split in its decision 
in Schock regarding the question of if Members of Congress can file 
interlocutory appeal to a federal circuit court based on the separation of 
powers doctrine. A clear understanding of the underlying history and 
policy concerns of the separation of powers doctrine, in light of the 
Speech or Debate Clause, should lead a court to determine that the 
separation of powers doctrine is a proper basis for an interlocutory appeal 
when made by a Member of Congress. Concerns of Members of Congress 
being “above the law” lack merit because a circuit court can still affirm 
the decision made by a district court allowing the case to proceed. 
Allowing interlocutory appeals by Members of Congress merely permits 
an indicted Member of Congress to utilize a narrowly tailored procedural 
tool supported by valid policy concerns. To hold otherwise could 
potentially burden elected representatives with litigation when they 
should be focusing on legislation and representing their constituents. 
 
 89. Id.   
 90. Id. at 936.  
 91. Myers, 635 F.2d at 942.   
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Finally, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to resolve the circuit 
split if it granted Aaron Schock’s petition for certiorari filed on October 
1, 2018.92 However, it denied the petition on February 19, 2019.93 If the 
Court did grant his petition, it should have relied on settled precedent from 
the Second, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits to hold that a congressman 
is able to file for pretrial review under both the separation of powers 
doctrine and the Speech or Debate Clause.  
The efficiency of Congress and the accountability of its Members is 
important, which is why the Constitution gave Congress the power to 
discipline its own Members rather than relying on the judiciary to do so. 
The judiciary should get out of the House and let legislators legislate. 
 
  
  
 
 
  92. Petition filed Oct 01, 2018 (No. 18-406). 
93.   Petition denied Feb 19, 2019 (No. 18–406). 
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